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Abstract
Wireless sensor networks are vulnerable to node capture attacks because sensor nodes are
usually deployed in unattended manner. Once attacker captures sensor nodes, he can com-
promise them and launch various types of attacks with those compromised nodes. Therefore,
node capture attacks are hazardous and should be detected as soon as possible to reduce the
harm incurred by them. To meet this need, we propose a node capture detection scheme in
wireless sensor networks. Our scheme detects the captured sensor nodes by using the sequen-
tial analysis. We analytically show that our scheme detects node capture attacks in robust and
efficient manner.
1. Introduction
Wireless sensor networks have recently gained much attention in the sense that they can be
readily deployed for many different types of missions. In particular, they are useful for the
missions that are difficult for humans to carry out. For example, they are suitable for sensing
dangerous natural phenomenon such as volcano eruption, biohazard monitoring, and forest
fire detection. In addition to these hazardous applications, sensor networks can also be de-
ployed for battle field surveillance, border monitoring, nuclear and chemical attack detection,
intrusion detection, flood detection, weather forecasting, traffic surveillance and patient mon-
itoring (Akyildiz et al., 2002).
To carry out a variety of missions, the network operator deploys the base station and a set of
small sensor devices in the network field. Specifically, sensor devices form ad-hoc networks,
collaborate with each other to sense the phenomenon associated with the assigned missions
and then send the sensory data to the base station. The network operator obtains the mission
related information by analyzing the data collected at the base station. To help sensor nodes
carry out the missions efficiently and effectively, many researchers proposed a variety of the
network service and communication protocols (Yick et al., 2008). Specifically, localization,
coverage, compression and aggregation protocols have been proposed for the network ser-
vices. Various network protocols from physical layer to transport layer have been proposed
for the communication.
Since sensor networks are often deployed in an unattended manner, most of these protocols
are exposed to a variety of attacks such as denial of service attacks, routing disruption and
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false data injection attacks, network service disruption attacks (Du & Xiao, 2008; Karlof &
Wagner, 2003; Wood & Stankovic, 2002). To defend the wireless sensor networks against these
various attacks, many schemes have been developed in the literature. For instance, secure
routing schemes have been proposed to mitigate routing disruption attacks (Karlof & Wag-
ner, 2003; Parno et al., 2006). False data injection attacks can be mitigated by using the au-
thentication schemes (Ye et al., 2004; Yu & Li, 2009; Zhu et al., 2004). Secure data aggregation
protocols are used to prevent attacker from disrupting aggregation (Chan et al., 2006; Deng et
al., 2003; Przydatek et al., 2003; Yang et al., 2006). Many schemes have also been proposed to
protect localization and time synchronization protocols from the threat (Capkun & Hubaux,
2006; Ganeriwal et al., 2005; Hu et al., 2008; Li et al., 2005; Liu et al., 2005; Song et al., 2007;
KSun et al., 2006).
However, most of them focus on making the protocols be attack-resilient rather than remov-
ing the source of attacks. Although attack-resiliency approach mitigates the threats on the
network services and communication protocols, this approach requires substantial time and
effort to continuously enhance the robustness of the protocols in accordance with the emer-
gence of new types of attacks. Moreover, since it is hard to predict new types of attacks, the
protocols will likely have resiliency only after being damaged by new types of attacks. Thus,
we need to detect and revoke the sources of attacks as soon as possible to substantially re-
duce the costs and damages incurred by employing attack-resilience approach. The principle
sources of various attacks are compromised sensor nodes in the sense that attacker can com-
promise sensor nodes by exploiting the unattended nature of wireless sensor networks and
thus do any malicious activities with them.
A straightforward strategy for sensor node compromise is to launch node capture attack in
which adversary physically captures sensor nodes, removes them from the network, compro-
mises and redeploys them in the network. After redeploying compromised nodes, he can
mount a variety of attacks with compromised nodes. For example, he can simply monitor a
significant fraction of the network traffic that would pass through these compromised nodes.
Alternatively, he could jam legitimate signals from benign nodes or inject falsified data to
corrupt monitoring operation of the sensors. A more aggressive attacker could undermine
common sensor network protocols, including cluster formation, routing, and data aggrega-
tion, thereby causing continual disruption to the network operations. Hence, node capture
attacks are dangerous and thus should be detected as quickly as possible to minimize the
damage incurred by them.
To meet this need, we propose a node capture attack detection scheme in wireless sensor net-
works. We use the fact that the physically captured nodes are not present in the network
during the period from the captured time to redeployed time. Accordingly, captured nodes
would not participate in any network operations during that period. By leveraging this intu-
ition, we detect captured nodes by using the Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT) Wald
(2004). The main advantage of our scheme is to quickly detect captured nodes with the aid of
the SPRT.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the network and attacker models.
Section 3 describes our node capture attack detection scheme. Section 4 presents the security
analysis of our proposed scheme. Section 5 presents the performance analysis of our proposed
scheme. Section 6 presents the related work. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. Models
In this section, we present the network models and attacker models for our proposed scheme.
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2.1 Network Models
We first assume a static sensor network in which the locations of sensor nodes do not change
after deployment. We also assume that every sensor node works in promiscuous mode and is
able to identify the sources of all messages originating from its neighbors. We believe that this
assumption does not incur substantial overhead because each node inspects only the source
IDs of the messages from its neighbors rather than the entire contents of the messages.
2.2 Attacker Models
We assume that an attacker can physically capture sensor nodes to compromise them. How-
ever, we place limits on the number of sensor nodes that he can physically capture in each
target region. This is reasonable from the perspective that an increase in the number of the
captured sensor nodes will lead to a rise in the likelihood that attacker is detected by intruder
detection mechanisms. Therefore, a rationale attacker will want to physically capture the lim-
ited number of sensor nodes in each target region while not being detected by intruder detec-
tion mechanisms. Moreover, we assume that it takes a certain amount of time from capturing
nodes to redeploying them in the network. This is reasonable in the sense that an attacker
needs some time to compromise captured sensor nodes.
3. Node Capture Attack Detection Using the Sequential Probability Ratio Test
In this section, we present the details of node capture detection scheme.
A straightforward approach for node capture detection is to leverage the intuition that a cap-
tured node is not present in the network from being captured to being redeployed. Specif-
ically, we first measure the absence time period of a sensor node and then compare it to a
pre-defined threshold. If it is more than threshold value, we decide the sensor node as a cap-
tured nodes. This simple approach achieves efficient node capture detection capability as long
as a threshold value is properly configured. However, it is not easy to configure a proper a
threshold value to detect captured nodes. If we set threshold to a high value, it is likely that
captured nodes bypass the detection. On the contrary, if we set threshold to a low value, it is
likely that benign nodes can be detected as captured nodes. To minimize these false positives
and negatives, we need to set up threshold in such a way that it is dynamically changed in
accordance with the measured absence time duration for a node. To meet this need, we use
the Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT) (Wald, 2004), which is a statistical decision pro-
cess and is regarded as a dynamic threshold scheme (Jung et al., 2004). We can take advantage
of using the SPRT from the perspective that the SPRT reaches a decision with few pieces of
samples while achieving low false positive and false negative rates (Wald, 2004). Specifically,
we apply the SPRT to node capture detection problem as follows. For each time slot, every
sensor node measures the number of messages sent by its neighbors. Each time the number
of messages sent by a neighbor is above (resp. equal to) zero, it will expedite the test process
to accept the null (resp. alternate) hypothesis that the neighbor is present (resp. absent) in
the network. Once a node accepts alternate hypothesis, it decides that the neighbor has been
captured and disconnects the communication with the neighbor.
After deployment, every sensor node u discovers its neighboring nodes. The entire time do-
main of node u is divided into a series of time slots. For each neighbor node v, node u mea-
sures the number of messages sent by v every time slot. We denote the number of messages
whose originator is v during the ith time slot by Ni. Let Vi be denote a Bernoulli random
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variable that is defined as:
Vi =
{
1 if Ni = 0
0 if Ni > 0
(1)
where i ≥ 1. The success probability δ of Bernoulli distribution is defined as
Pr(Vi = 1) = 1− Pr(Vi = 0) = δ. (2)
If δ is smaller than or equal to a preset threshold δ′, it is likely that node v is present in the
network and is accordingly not captured by attacker. On the contrary, if δ > δ′, it is likely
that node v is absent in the network and is accordingly captured by attacker. The problem of
deciding whether v is captured or not can be formulated as a hypothesis testing problem with
null and alternate hypotheses of δ ≤ δ′ and δ > δ′, respectively. In this problem, we need to
devise an appropriate sampling strategy in order to prevent hypothesis testing from leading
to a wrong decision. In particular, we should specify the maximum possibilities of wrong
decisions that we want to tolerate for a good sampling strategy. To do this, we reformulate
the above hypothesis testing problem as one with null and alternate hypotheses of δ ≤ δ0 and
δ ≥ δ1, respectively, such that δ0 < δ1. In this reformulated problem, the acceptance of the
alternate hypothesis is regarded as a false positive error when δ ≤ δ0, and the acceptance of
the null hypothesis is regarded as false negative error when δ ≥ δ1. To prevent the decision
process from making these two types of errors, we define a user-configured false positive α′
and false negative β′ in such a way that the false positive and negative should not exceed α′
and β′, respectively.
Now we present how node u performs the SPRT to make a decision of v with the n observed
samples, where Ni is treated as a sample. Let us define H0 as the null hypothesis that v is
present in the network and is not captured by attacker, H1 as the alternate hypothesis that
v is not present in the network and is captured by attacker. We then define Ln as the log-
probability ratio on n samples, given as:
Ln = ln
Pr(V1, . . . ,Vn|H1)
Pr(V1, . . . ,Vn|H0)
Assume that Vi is independent and identically distributed. Then Ln can be rewritten as:
Ln = ln
∏
n
i=1 Pr(Vi|H1)
∏
n
i=1 Pr(Vi|H0)
=
n
∑
i=1
ln
Pr(Vi|H1)
Pr(Vi|H0)
(3)
Let yn denote the number of times that Vi = 1 in the n samples. Then we have Ln = yn ln
δ1
δ0
+
(n − yn) ln
1−δ1
1−δ0
where δ0 = Pr(Vi = 1|H0), δ1 = Pr(Vi = 1|H1). The rationale behind
the configuration of δ0 and δ1 is as follows. δ0 should be configured in accordance with the
likelihood of the occurrence that a benign node is determined to be absent in the network
during a time slot. δ1 should be configured to consider the likelihood of the occurrence that a
captured node is determined to be absent in the network during a time slot. On the basis of
the log-probability ratio Ln, the SPRT for H0 against H1 is given as follows:
• Ln ≤ ln
β′
1−α′ : accept H0 and terminate the test.
• Ln ≥ ln
1−β′
α′ : accept H1 and terminate the test.
• ln
β′
1−α′ < Ln < ln
1−β′
α′ : continue the test process with another observation.
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This SPRT can be written as:
• yn ≤ s0(n) : accept H0 and terminate the test.
• yn ≥ s1(n) : accept H1 and terminate the test
• s0(n) < yn < s1(n) : continue the test process with another observation.
Where
s0(n) =
ln
β′
1−α′ + n ln
1−δ0
1−δ1
ln δ1δ0 − ln
1−δ1
1−δ0
, s1(n) =
ln
1−β′
α′ + n ln
1−δ0
1−δ1
ln δ1δ0 − ln
1−δ1
1−δ0
,α′ and β′ are the user-configured false positive and false negative rates, respectively.
If the SPRT terminates in acceptance of H0, node u restarts the SPRT with newly received
messages from v. However, if the SPRT accepts H1, u terminates the SPRT on v, decides v as a
captured node, and disconnects the communication with v.
The pseudocode for the SPRT is presented as Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 SPRT for replica detection
INITIALIZATION: t = 1, y = 0
INPUT: Nt
OUTPUT: accept the hypothesis H0 or H1
compute s0(t) and s1(t)
if Nt == 0 then
y = y + 1
end if
if y >= s1(t) then
accept the alternate hypothesis H1 and terminate the test
end if
if y <= s0(t) then
accept the null hypothesis H0 and initialize t to 1 and y to 0
return;
end if
t = t + 1
4. Security Analysis
In this section, we first present the detection capability of our scheme and then discuss about
the limitations of node capture attacks under the presence of our scheme and countermeasures
against some possible attack strategies against our scheme.
In the SPRT, the following types of errors are defined.
• α : error probability that the SPRT leads to accepting H1 when H0 is true.
• β : error probability that the SPRT leads to accepting H0 when H1 is true.
Since H0 is the hypothesis that a node u has not been captured, α and β are the false positive
and false negative probabilities of the SPRT, respectively. According to Wald’s theory (Wald,
2004), the upper bounds of α and β are:
α ≤
α′
1− β′
, β ≤
β′
1− α′
(4)
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Fig. 1. Upper limit on detection probability vs. β′ when α′ = 0.01.
Fig. 2. Upper limit on detection probability vs. β′ when α′ = 0.05.
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Fig. 3. ψ vs. δ0 when α
′ = β′ = 0.01.
Furthermore, Wald proved that the sum of the false positive and negative probabilities of
the SPRT are limited by the sum of user-configured false positive and negative probabilities.
Namely, the following inequality holds:
α + β ≤ α′ + β′ (5)
Since β is the false negative probability, (1 − β) is the node capture detection probability.
Accordingly, the lower bound on the node catpure detection probability will be:
(1− β) ≥
1− α′ − β′
1− α′
(6)
From Equations 4 and 6, we can see that low user-configured false positive and negative prob-
abilities will lead to a low false negative probability for the sequential test process. Hence, it
will result in high detection rates.
As shown in Figures 1 and 2, we study how α′ and β′ affect the upper limit of node capture
detection probability (1− β). Specifically, the upper limit decreases as the rise in β′ when the
user configures α′ to 0.01 and 0.05. However, we see that the upper limit is bounded from
below 0.99 (resp., 0.945) when α′ = 0.01 (resp., 0.05) as long as β′ is configured to at most
0.01 (resp., 0.05). Hence, the node capture detection capability is guaranteed with at least
probability of 0.945 when both α′ and β′ are set to at most 0.05.
Now we derive the limitation of the time period from when a node is captured and removed
in location L to when it is redeployed in the same location L. Suppose that the entire n time
slots are taken from the removal to redeployment of captured node. Since the captured node
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Fig. 4. ψ vs. δ0 when α
′ = β′ = 0.05.
will not be present in the network for n time slots and a time slot corresponds to a sample in
the SPRT, yn = n holds. Accordingly, yn = n < s1(n) should hold for captured node to avoid
being detected. In other words, the following Inequality should hold to bypass the detection:
n < ψ =
ln
1−β′
α′
ln δ1δ0
(7)
As shown in Figures 3 and 4, we study how the values of δ0 and δ1 affect ψ when α
′ =
0.01, β′ = 0.01 and α′ = 0.05, β′ = 0.05. Specifically, ψ increases as δ0 rises when δ1 is config-
ured to 0.6 and 0.9, but it decreases as δ1 rises when δ0 is fixed. We see from this that small
and large values of δ0 and δ1 lead to the small value of ψ. We also observe that n is less than 5
and 3 in the case of α′ = β′ = 0.01 and α′ = β′ = 0.05, respectively. This means that attacker
should finish compromising and redeploying the captured node within at most five time slots
in order to prevent them from being detected. Hence, our scheme will substantially limit the
time duration for captured node not to be detected.
However, if a captured node is not redeployed in its initial location L but in different location
L′, even though it cannot be accepted as legitimate neighbors by the nodes around L, it can
still be accepted as legitimate neighbors by the nodes around L′ and thus have an impact on
these nodes. To defend the network against this attack, we propose a countermeasure based
on the group deployment strategy. This involves three important assumptions.
First, we assume that sensor nodes are deployed in group-by-group. More specifically, sensor
nodes are grouped together by the network operator and programmed with the correspond-
ing group information before deployment, with each group of nodes being deployed towards
the same location, called the group deployment point. After deployment, the group members
exhibit similar geographic relations. We argue that this is reasonable for sensor network in
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which nodes are spread over a field, such as being dropped from an airplane or spread out
by hand. A simple way to do this would be to keep the groups of nodes in bags marked
with the group IDs and use a marked map with the group IDs on it. All that is needed is a
map of the territory and a way to pre-determine the deployment points, such as assigning a
point on a grid to each group. This argument is further supported by the fact that the group
deployment strategy has been used for various applications in sensor networks such as key
distribution (Du et al., 2004), detection of anomalies in localization (Du et al., 2005), and public
key authentication (Du et al., 2005).
The deployment follows a particular probability density function (pdf), say f , which describes
the likelihood of a node being a certain distance from its group deployment point. For sim-
plicity, we use a two-dimensional Gaussian distribution to model f , as in (Du et al., 2005). Let
(xg, yg) be the group deployment point for a group g. A sensor node in group g is placed in a
location (x, y) in accordance with the following model:
f (x, y) =
1
2πσ2
e
−
(x−xg )2+(y−yg )2
2σ2 (8)
where (x, y) is group deployment point and σ is the standard deviation of the two-
dimensional Gaussian distribution. According to Equation 8, 68% and 99% of nodes in a
group are placed within a circle whose center is the group deployment point and radius is σ
and 3σ, respectively.
Second, we assume that it takes some time for an attacker to capture and compromise a sensor
node. This need not be a long time, but we assume that there is a minimum amount of time
that it takes to compromise a node once it has been deployed. 1 Third, we assume that the
clocks of all nodes are loosely synchronized with a maximum error of ǫ. This can be achieved
by the use of secure time synchronization protocols as proposed in (Ganeriwal et al., 2005; Hu
et al., 2008; Song et al., 2007; KSun et al., 2006).
Under these assumptions, the main idea of the proposed countermeasure is to pre-announce
the deployment time of each group, and have nodes treat as captured and redeployed any
node that initiates communications after a long time of its expected deployment. More specif-
ically, when a group Gu of nodes are deployed, they will be pre-loaded with a time stamp Tu
that is digitally signed by a trusted server. This time stamp indicates that the sensor nodes in
Gu should finish neighbor discovery before time Tu. If they try to setup neighbor connections
with other nodes after time Tu, they are considered to be captured and redeployed nodes. The
time stamp Tu should be a function of the deployment time T, the time Tr needed for captur-
ing, compromising, and redeploying a node, and the maximum time synchronization error ǫ.
Specifically, the network operator should set T + Td + ǫ < Tu < T + Td + Tr − ǫ, where Td
is the neighbor discovery time, such that no nodes should have clocks too fast to accept the
new node, but no new node could be compromised and accepted in time. This means that
ǫ < 0.5Tc determines the maximum amount of allowable error.
5. Performance Analysis
This section describes howmany observations are required on average for each node to decide
whether its neighboring node has been captured or not.
Let n denote the number of samples to terminate the SPRT. Since n is changed with the types
of samples, it is treated as a random variable with an expected value E[n]. According to (Wald,
1 According to (Hartung et al., 2005), it took approximately one minute to compromise a node.
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Fig. 5. E[n|H0] vs. δ0 when α
′ = β′ = 0.01.
Fig. 6. E[n|H0] vs. δ0 when α
′ = β′ = 0.05.
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Fig. 7. E[n|H1] vs. δ0 when α
′ = β′ = 0.01.
Fig. 8. E[n|H1] vs. δ0 when α
′ = β′ = 0.05.
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2004), E[n] is given by:
E[n] =
E[Ln]
E
[
ln
Pr(Vi |H1)
Pr(Vi |H0)
] (9)
From Equation 9, we compute the expected values of n conditioned on hypotheses H0 and H1
as follows:
E[n|H0] =
(1− α′) ln
β′
1−α′ + α
′ ln
1−β′
α′
δ0 ln
δ1
δ0
+ (1− δ0) ln
1−δ1
1−δ0
E[n|H1] =
β′ ln
β′
1−α′ + (1− β
′) ln
1−β′
α′
δ1 ln
δ1
δ0
+ (1− δ1) ln
1−δ1
1−δ0
(10)
As shown in Figures 5, 6, 7, and 8, we study how the values of δ0 and δ1 affect E[n|H0] and
E[n|H1] when α
′ = β′ = 0.01 and α′ = β′ = 0.05. Specifically, E[n|H1] increases as the rise of
δ0 for a given value of δ1. This means that captured nodes are detected with a small number
of samples when δ0 is small. For a given value of δ0, E[n|H1] decreases as the increase of δ1.
This means that large values of δ1 reduce the number of samples required for node capture
detection. Similarly, the small value of δ0 and the large value of δ1 contribute to decrease of
E[n|H0], leading to the small number of samples required for deciding that benign node is not
captured.
6. Related Work
In this section, we describe a number of research works that are related to node capture detec-
tion in wireless sensor networks.
In (Tague & Poovendran, 2008), node capture attacks aremodeled inwireless sensor networks.
However, this work did not propose detection schemes against node capture attacks. In (Conti
et al., 2008), node capture attack detection scheme was proposed in mobile sensor networks.
They leverage the intuition that a mobile node is regarded as being captured if it is not con-
tacted by other mobile nodes during a certain period of time. However, this scheme will not
work in static sensor networks where sensor nodes do not move after deployment.
Software-attestation based schemes have been proposed to detect the subverted software
modules of sensor nodes (Park & Shin, 2005; Seshadri et al., 2004; Shaneck et al., 2005; Yang et
al., 2007). Specifically, the base station checks whether the flash image codes have been ma-
liciously altered by performing attestation randomly chosen portions of image codes or the
entire codes in (Park & Shin, 2005; Seshadri et al., 2004; Shaneck et al., 2005). In (Yang et al.,
2007), a sensor node’s image codes are attested by its neighbors. However, all these schemes
require each sensor to be periodically attested and thus incur a large overhead in terms of
communication and computation.
Reputation-based trust management schemes have been proposed to manage individual
node’s trust in accordance with its actions (Ganeriwal & Srivastava, 2004; Li at al., 2007;
YSun et al., 2006). Specifically, a reputation-based trust management scheme was proposed
in (Ganeriwal & Srivastava, 2004). The main idea of the scheme is to use a Bayesian formula-
tion in order to compute an individual node’s trust. In (YSun et al., 2006) information theoretic
frameworks for trust evaluation were proposed. Specifically, entropy-based and probability-
based schemes have been proposed to compute an individual node’s trust. In (Li at al., 2007),
node mobility is leveraged to reduce an uncertainty in trust computation and speed up the
trust convergence. However, these trust management schemes do not revoke compromised
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nodes and thus compromised nodes can keep performing malicious activities in the network.
ID traceback schemes have been proposed to locate the malicious source of false data (Ye et al.,
2007; Zhang et al., 2006). However, they only trace a source of the data sent to the base station
and thus they do not locate the malicious sources that send false data or control messages to
other benign nodes in the network.
After physically capturing and compromising a few sensor nodes, attacker can generate
many replica nodes with the same ID and secret keying materials as the compromised nodes,
and mount a variety of attacks with replica nodes. Randomized and line-selected multicast
schemes were proposed to detect replicas in wireless sensor networks (Parno et al., 2005).
In the randomized multicast scheme, every node is required to multicast a signed location
claim to randomly chosen witness nodes. A witness node that receives two conflicting loca-
tion claims for a node concludes that the node has been replicated and initiates a process to
revoke the node. The line-selected multicast scheme reduces the communication overhead
of the randomized multicast scheme by having every claim-relaying node participate in the
replica detection and revocation process.
A Randomized, Efficient, and Distributed (RED) protocol was proposed to enhance the line-
selected multicast scheme of (Parno et al., 2005) in terms of replica detection probability, stor-
age and computation overheads (Conti et al., 2007). However, RED still has the same com-
munication overhead as the line-selected multicast scheme of (Parno et al., 2005). More sig-
nificantly, their protocol requires repeated location claims over time, meaning that the cost of
the scheme needs to be multiplied by the number of runs during the total deployment time.
Localized multicast schemes based on the grid cell topology detect replicas by letting location
claim be multicasted to a single cell or multiple cells (Zhu et al., 2007). The main strength
of (Zhu et al., 2007) is that it achieves higher detection rates than the best scheme of (Parno et
al., 2005). However, (Zhu et al., 2007) has similar communication overheads as (Parno et al.,
2005).
A clone detection scheme was proposed in sensor networks (Choi et al., 2007). In this scheme,
the network is considered to be a set of non-overlapping subregions. An exclusive subset is
formed in each subregion. If the intersection of subsets is not empty, it implies that replicas are
included in those subsets. Fingerprint-based replica node detection scheme was proposed in
sensor networks (Xing et al., 2008). In this scheme, nodes report fingerprints, which identify a
set of their neighbors, to the base station. The base station performs replica detection by using
the property that fingerprints of replicas conflict each other.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a node capture attack detection scheme using the Sequential Prob-
ability Ratio Test (SPRT). We showed the limitations of the benefits that attacker can take from
launching node capture attacks when our scheme is employed. We also analytically showed
that our scheme detects node capture attacks with a few number of samples while sustaining
the false positive and false negative rates below 1%.
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